Development of the Law in Wisconsin in the Area of Juvenile Delinquency by Larson, Charles L.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 59
Issue 2 1976 (Number 2) Article 2
Development of the Law in Wisconsin in the Area
of Juvenile Delinquency
Charles L. Larson
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Charles L. Larson, Development of the Law in Wisconsin in the Area of Juvenile Delinquency, 59 Marq. L. Rev. 251 (1976).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol59/iss2/2
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW IN
WISCONSIN IN THE AREA OF JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY
CHARLES L. LARSON*
Following a precedent established in Illinois two years ear-
lier, Wisconsin's legislature created the first juvenile court in
this state by enacting chapter 90 of the Laws of 1901.1 By its
provisions the act regulated the "treatment and control of de-
pendent, neglected and delinquent children in counties having
over one hundred and fifty thousand population. '2
The idea of special treatment for children charged with
being delinquent, neglected or dependent was not conceived in
Illinois.3 A more compassionate consideration for children in
those circumstances had been employed in other places, but it
was in Illinois that the first juvenile court was organized in
1899, when the state legislature created such a court in popu-
lous Cook County. Thereafter the movement spread rapidly
throughout the United States.4
When chapter 90 was first enacted, only one county in Wis-
consin, Milwaukee County, came within the provisions of the
act. In the legislative session of 1903, chapter 3595 provided for
juvenile courts beyond Milwaukee County by extending juris-
diction to all counties having populations of sixty-five thou-
sand or more. After one further amendment in 1905,8 chapter
460 of the Laws of 1911 expanded application of the act to all
Wisconsin counties.7
In each of the several legislative acts referred to above, the
* County and Juvenile Court Judge, Ozaukee County, Wisconsin; L.L.B. 1930,
Marquette University Law School; Chairman, Wisconsin Board of Juvenile Court
Judges (1966); Chairman, Wisconsin Board of Criminal Judges (1963); former district
attorney of Ozaukee County, Wisconsin.
1. Wis. Laws 1901, ch. 90.
2. Id.
3. For a concise survey of the origins of the juvenile court system, see ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, VOL. 5, p.476-78.
4. By 1904 ten states had juvenile courts; after the first ten years, twenty states
and the District of Columbia; by 1914, thirty states; and in 1928 only two states
(Wyoming and Maine) were without juvenile courts. Id.
5. Wis. Laws 1903, ch. 359.
6. Wis. Laws 1905, ch. 496.
7. Wis. Laws 1911, ch. 460.
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intent of the legislature to aid in the rehabilitation of delin-
quent children is clearly recited. Section 6 of Chapter 90, Laws
of 1901, provided:
In case of a delinquent child the court may continue the
hearing from time to time, and may commit the child to the
care and guardianship of a probation officer duly appointed
by the court, and may allow said child to remain in its home,
subject to the visitation of the probation officer; such child
to report to the probation officer as often as may be required,
and subject to be returned to the court for further proceedings
whenever such action may appear to be necessary; or the
court may commit the child to the care and guardianship of
the probation officer, to be placed in a suitable family, sub-
ject to the friendly supervision of such probation officer; or
it may authorize the said probation officer, to board out the
child in some suitable family home, in case provision is made
by voluntary contribution or otherwise; for the payment of
the board of such child until a suitable provision may be
made for the child in a home without such payment; or the
court may commit the child if a boy, to an industrial school
for boys, or if a girl, to an industrial school for girls; or the
court may commit the child to the care and custody of some
association or institution that will receive it, embracing in its
objects the care of neglected, dependent or delinquent chil-
dren.8
Section 8 of chapter 901 required a preliminary hearing for
a child under age sixteen charged with violation of any law of
this state, the penalty for which was imprisonment in the state
prison and permitted release of the child on bail, provisions not
presently contained in the Juvenile Code. Section 8 granted the
courts great latitude in the disposition of juvenile cases. The
section provided that:
[A]ll provisions of law relating to proceedings in criminal
cases in circuit court shall be applicable to the trial, sentence
and commitment of such offenders in such juvenile court;
provided however that such court may in its discretion com-
mit such offenders as provided in section 6 of this act."
In view of the harsh language contained in the last two sent-
ences of section 8, it may appear that creation of the juvenile
8. Wis. Laws 1901, ch. 90, § 6.
9. Wis. Laws 1908, ch. 90, § 8.
10. Id.
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court did little to aid some delinquent children in 1901. While
laws were enacted to provide special treatment for delinquent
children in order to aid in their rehabilitation, in those cases
involving commission of a felony, a judge clearly had discretion
to commit the child to adult prison.
Under the provisions of the present Wisconsin Statutes sec-
tion 48.18," a judge may exercise the same discretion when
considering certain cases involving sixteen and seventeen year
olds by waiving the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. However,
rules promulgated by statute and federal and state appellate
decisions protect a child's constitutional rights and make exist-
ing procedure a far departure from that outlined in this early
law. Relying on a presumption of fairness on the part of juve-
nile court judges, the early legislature adopted the parens
patriae philosophy in outlining treatment and control of its
wayward youth. That philosophy and the decisions affecting it
will be considered later.
Chapter 97, Laws of 1903,12 and Chapter 496, Laws of 1905,' 3
redefined the term "delinquent child" to include all juveniles
who had committed any one of numerous acts of misconduct.
With two or possibly three exceptions, none of the offenses
listed constituted crimes. Chapter 496 provided:
The words "delinquent child," shall include any child,
under the age of sixteen years, who violates any law of this
state, the penalty for which is not imprisonment in the state
prison, or who violates any city or village ordinance; or who
is incorrigible; or who knowingly associates with thieves, vi-
cious or immoral persons; or who is growing up in idleness or
crime; or who knowingly patronizes any place where any
gaming device is or shall be operated; or who knowingly visits
or enters a house of ill-repute; or who patronizes, visits, or
enters any stall, saloon, or wine room, or any saloon fre-
quented by men or women of bad repute; or who attends,
visits or enters any dance held in any room or hall in connec-
tion with a saloon, unless accompanied by parents or legal
guardian; or who loafs or congregates with groups or gangs of
other boys at or about any railroad yards or tracks; or who
habitually uses obscene, vulgar or profane language, or is
guilty of immoral conduct in any public place, or about any
11. Wis. STAT. § 48.18 (1973).
12. Wis. Laws 1903, ch. 97.
13. Wis. Laws 1905, ch. 496.
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schoolhouse. Where a parental school is available, a juvenile
disorderly person may be classed as a delinquent. 4
Chapter 460, Laws of 1911, extended the definition of "de-
linquent child" to include "any girl under the age of eighteen
years and any boy under the age of seventeen years."' 5 Chapter
439, Laws of 1929, provided that the words "delinquent child"
shall mean "any child under the age of eighteen years."' 6 Since
1929, no change has been made concerning the age of children
who are subject to the provisions of Wisconsin's juvenile laws.
From 1919 until 1955, Chapter 48 of the Wisconsin Statutes
bore the title "Child Protection and Reformation." In 1955 it
was comprehensively revised and renamed "The Children's
Code." Among the many changes and additions, one which
appeared in several sections was a statement declaring the in-
tent of the new chapter. Section 48.01(2) prefaces the Code and
provides as follows:
INTENT. It is declared to be the intent of this chapter to
promote the best interests of the children of this state
through:
(a) Juvenile courts adequately equipped to review each
case on its individual merits under procedures designed to
safeguard the legal rights of the child and his parents.'7
Five additional subsections follow section 48.01(2), all of
which recite how the code is intended to promote the best
interests of delinquent, dependent and neglected children.
Subsection (3) relates to construction and provides as fol-
lows:
This chapter shall be liberally construed to effect the objec-
tives in sub (2). The best interests of the child shall always
be of paramount consideration, but the court shall also con-
sider the interest of the parents or guardian of the child and
the interest of the public.'"
Section 48.18, permitting waiver of juvenile court jurisdic-
tion contains the following:
Except as provided in s. 48.17, the criminal and civil courts
14. Wis. Laws 1905, ch. 496.
15. Wis. Laws 1911, ch. 460.
16. Wis. Laws 1929, ch. 439.
17. Wis. STAT. § 48.01(2) (1973).
18. Wis. STAT. § 48.01(3) (1973).
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shall have jurisdiction over a child 16 or older who is alleged
to have violated a state law or a county or municipal ordi-
nance only if the juvenile court judge deems it contrary to the
best interest of such child or of the public to hear the case
and enters an order waiving his jurisdiction and referring the
matter to the district attorney, corporation counsel or city
attorney, for appropriate proceedings in a criminal or civil
court.'"
The "best interests of the child" doctrine appears to have
originated in the case of Chapsky v. Wood2 1 in which the Kan-
sas Supreme Court repudiated the rule which held that the
rights of parents were primary. A later decision by the New
York Court of Appeals, Finlay v. Finlay,2' held that the chan-
cellor acted as parens patriae to do what is best for the interests
of the child.22
The constitutionality of Wisconsin's laws relating to the
treatment and control of dependent, neglected, and delinquent
children was not considered by the Wisconsin Supreme Court
until 1918. In that year the constitutionality of the juvenile
code was tested in the combined cases of State v. Scholl and
State v. Pollard.3 That case involved an appeal from the cir-
cuit court of Milwaukee County which had found the juveniles
to be delinquent and placed them on probation. The appellants
contended that the law was unconstitutional because it denied
a jury trial and authorized conviction of a crime without due
process. In this landmark case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the law. In essence, Chief Jus-
tice Winslow's opinion ratified the parens patriae approach to
the treatment and rehabilitation of juvenile delinquents. The
opinion states in part as follows:
It is sufficient to say on this point that the proceedings
under this law are in no sense criminal proceedings, nor is the
result in any case a conviction or punishment for crime. They
are simply statutory proceedings by which the state in the
legitimate exercise of its police power, or, in other words, its
right to preserve its own integrity and future existence,
19. Wis. STAT. § 48.18 (1973).
20. 26 Kan. 650 (1881).
21. 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925).
22. The development of this doctrine is traced by Chief Justice E. Harold Hallows
in the decision in Adoption of Tachick, 60 Wis. 2d 540, 210 N.W.2d 865 (1973).
23. 167 Wis. 504, 167 N.W. 830 (1918).
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reaches out its arm in a kindly way and provides for the
protection of its children from parental neglect or from vi-
cious influences and surroundings, eitl~er by keeping watch
over the child while in its natural home, or where that seems
impracticable, by placing it in an institution designed for
that purpose. 4
Again in 1920, an appeal from a finding of delinquency was
heard by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. In State v. Zirbel,25 the
court said:
The proceedings are not to be conducted according to the
practice and procedure governing actions. The court is to act
in place of a parent and necessarily has great power which is
not to be restricted by the rules of procedure followed in
criminal courts."
The Zirbel case was followed by the case of In Re Alley,27
in which the policy established in the prior two cases was af-
firmed and restated.
This law was not designed as a method of punishment for
crimes committed by juveniles. Every section and paragraph
of the statute is permeated with the benevolent purpose of
improving the child's condition and not with punishing his
past conduct. The whole object and purpose of this law will
be defeated if it is construed and applied as a punitive stat-
ute.Y
Many years passed before another constitutional test of
Wisconsin's juvenile code was made. In the 1944 case of Harry
v. State,29 the court affirmed Scholl, Zirbel and Alley, and with
regard to a challenge that the petition did not set forth a spe-
cific act or acts constituting delinquency, the court responded
that a petition need not do so to give the juvenile court jurisdic-
tion.3 0
At no time following the establishment of juvenile courts in
Wisconsin and all other states did the United States Supreme
Court consider the constitutionality of juvenile court procedure
24. Id. at 509, 167 N.W. at 831.
25. 171 Wis. 498, 177 N.W. 601 (1920).
26. Id. at 499, 177 N.W. at 601.
27. 174 Wis. 85, 182 N.W. 360 (1921).
28. Id. at 91-92, 182 N.W. at 362.
29. 246 Wis. 69, 16 N.W.2d 390 (1944).
30. Id. at 77, 16 N.W.2d at 393.
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until 1966 when the celebrated case of Petition of Kent3 was
decided. Kent, a youth of sixteen, was charged with several
violent offenses in the District of Columbia. A petition for
waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction was filed with the juvenile
court in Washington, D.C., and the court granted the waiver.
Under its juvenile code, the juvenile court in the District of
Columbia had the right to waive jurisdiction and was not re-
quired to conduct a hearing or give reasons for its action. No
hearing was conducted and no reasons for waiving were given.
In an opinion written by Justice Fortas, the Supreme Court
stated that the right of a child to be heard in juvenile court
could not be waived arbitrarily and required that he receive:
(1) a hearing,
(2) a statement of reasons for waiver, and
(3) effective assistance of counsel.
It also established the following eight standards to guide a
trial court in making its determination:
(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense to the community
and whether the protection of the community required waiver;
(2) whether the alleged offense was committed in an ag-
gressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner;
(3) whether the alleged offense was against persons or
against property, greater weight being given to offenses against
persons especially if personal injury resulted;
(4) the prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether
there is evidence upon which a grand jury might be expected
to return an indictment (to be determined by consultation with
the United States Attorney);
(5) the desirability of trial and disposition of the entire
offense in one court when the juvenile's associates in the al-
leged offense are adults who will be charged with a crime in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia;
(6) the sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as de-
termined by consideration of his home, environmental situa-
tion, emotional attitude and pattern of living;
(7) the record and previous history of the juvenile, includ-
ing previous contacts with a youth aid division, other law en-
forcement agencies, juvenile courts and other jurisdictions,
prior period of probation to this Court, or prior commitments
to juvenile institutions;
31. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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(8) the prospects for adequate protection of the public and
the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he
is found to have committed the alleged offense) by the use of
procedures, services and facilities currently available to the
juvenile court.32
In making its decision, the Court reviewed the purpose and
philosophy of juvenile courts, and concluded that:
1. The State is parens patriae rather than prosecuting
attorney and judge. But the admonition to function in a "par-
ental" relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrar-
iness.
2. Because the State is supposed to proceed in respect of
the child proceedings as parens patriae and not as adversary,
courts have relied on the premise that the proceedings are
"civil" in nature and not criminal, and have asserted that the
child cannot complain of the deprivation of important rights
available in criminal cases. It has been asserted that he can
claim only the fundamental due process right to fair treat-
ment. For example, it has been held that he is not entitled
to bail; to indictment by grand jury; to a speedy and public
trial; to trial by jury; to immunity against self-incrimination;
to confrontation of his accusers; and in some jurisdictions
[citations omitted] that he is not entitled to counsel.
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable pur-
pose of juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent years
raise serious questions as to whether actual performance
measures well enough against theoretical purpose to make
tolerable the immunity of the process from the reach of con-
stitutional guarantees applicable to adults. There is much
evidence that some juvenile courts, including that of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, lack the personnel, facilities and tech-
niques to perform adequately as representatives of the State
in a parens patriae capacity, at least with respect to children
charged with law violation. There is evidence, in fact, that
there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the
worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections
accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative
treatment postulated for children. 33
After a lull of twenty-two years following Harry v. State,34
an appeal in a juvenile case was taken to the Wisconsin Su-
32. Id. at 566-67.
33. Id. at 554-56.
34. 246 Wis. 69, 16 N.W.2d 390 (1944).
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preme Court in Winburn v. State.35 At issue was the question
of whether insanity constituted a defense in juvenile court. The
court's opinion holding that it did was rendered six months
after the decision in Kent and contained lengthy excerpts from
Kent and raised many questions concerning the philosophy
behind the existing approach to juvenile delinquency. The
court stated:
The philosophy behind the juvenile act is rehabilitation
and treatment, but what may appear to a juvenile worker or
judge as treatment may look like punishment to the juvenile.
Irrespective of what we call the juvenile procedure, and no
matter how benign and well-intended the judge who adminis-
ters the system, the juvenile procedures, to some degree at
least, smack of "crime and punishment." While the primary
statutory goal is the best interest of the child, that interest
is, as it should be, conditioned by the consideration of "the
interest of the public." Section 48.01(3), Stats. The interest
of the public is served not only by rehabilitating juveniles
when that is possible, but the interest of the public is also
served by removing some juveniles from environments where
they are likely to harm their fellow citizens. Retribution, in
practice, plays a role in the function of the juvenile court. The
judgments of juvenile courts do serve as deterrents to the
conduct of at least a segment of our juvenile society, not
because those juveniles fear rehabilitation, but because they
fear incarceration and punishment. Despite all protestations
to the contrary, the adjudication of delinquency carries with
it a social stigma. This court can take judicial notice that in
common parlance "juvenile delinquent" is a term of opprob-
ium and it is not society's accolade bestowed on the success-
fully rehabilitated. 8
Kent and Winburn were harbingers of significant changes
to come. They were soon followed by the far-reaching decision
of the United States Supreme Court in In re Gault,17 which
considered the rights of a fifteen-year-old boy who had been
charged with the minor but annoying offense of making inde-
cent telephone calls. Gerald Gault was sent to an Arizona
school for boys for a period of time which could have extended
to his twenty-first birthday. It was pointed out by the Court
35. 32 Wis. 2d 152, 145 N.W.2d 178 (1966).
36. Id. at 161-62, 145 N.W.2d at 182-83.
37. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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that an adult found guilty of that offense would have received
a fine or a comparatively short jail sentence.
The decision in Gault held that the due process of the law
requires that juveniles charged with being delinquent must be
accorded certain fundamental rights:
(a) the right of parents and juvenile to receive a written
copy of a petition or complaint containing a recitation of
charge alleging delinquency, with particularity;
(b) the right to receive in sufficient time to prepare a
defense to the charges;
(c) the right to legal counsel at every stage of the pro-
ceedings;
(d) 'the right to invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination;
(e) the right to confrontation and cross-examination;
and
(f) the right to receive a transcript of the proceedings
and to seek appellate review. 8
Although the holding in Gault made sweeping changes in
juvenile court procedure, the Court reiterated that the hearing
to be held need not conform with all of the requirements of a
criminal trial .3 No consideration was given to burden of proof,
rules of evidence, record to be kept during a hearing, right to
bail, requirements of the court to make findings of fact, right
to a trial by jury, right to a preliminary hearing to determine
probable cause, or right of the public to attend juvenile hear-
ings. Most of those areas have been considered on appellate
review in the years which have passed since 1967.
Gault referred to the penalty which would have followed the
conviction of an adult on the same charge. A recent decision
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in In re Interest of J.K. (a
minor),0 also considered the issue of whether or not the term
of a juvenile's commitment should exceed that which would be
imposed on an adult convicted of the same chage.
Appellant notes that transfers of legal custody to the state
department of health and social services are "until the age of
18," and claims constitutional infirmity in such commitment
to the department for institutional placement for an indeter-
38. Id. at 10.
39. Id. at 30, citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966).
40. 68 Wis. 2d 426, 228 N.W.2d 713 (1975).
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minate period which may extend ". . . beyond the sentence
permissible for an adult as punishment for the equivalent
crime." This argument equates institutional placement
under the Children's Code with incarceration of an adult of-
fender under the Criminal Code. Such exact and complete
analogizing of proceedings in the children's court with pro-
ceedings in the criminal courts was early rejected by this
court. More recently, we stated: "The juvenile law is not to
be administered as a criminal statute," and, very recently,
held:
"... Due process and fair treatment are to mark juvenile
proceedings as well as adult trials. Both have a common har-
bor, the fair and just disposition of matters before the court,
but they may sail by different routes to the shared destina-
tion. Each must avoid the reefs of constitutionally assured
protections, but they need not sail side by side in so doing.
Any analogy established between steps in juvenile proceed-
ings with states in the processing of criminal cases may be
arguably persuasive, but it is not controlling."
If the state legislature were to eliminate incarceration as
an appropriate penalty for the adult crime of possession of
LSD, that would not limit or change the right of a juvenile
court judge to place an adjudged delinquent, found to have
possessed LSD, in the custody of the state department until
the age of eighteen, unless earlier released. Such commitment
of a juvenile is not for the purpose of penalty or punishment,
but for the purpose of effecting a result that will serve the
best interests of the child, its parents and the public. The
same measuring stick does not apply to both adult criminals
and juvenile delinquents."
In its "Final Report to the Governor" in 1972,42 the Citizen's
Committee on Offender Rehabilitation made a recommenda-
tion which is at odds with the Wisconsin Supreme Court's deci-
sion in In re Interest of J.K. (a minor). Their recommendation
was that, "Any court order for supervision or transfer of cus-
tody which affects a child shall extend for a definite period of
time which may not exceed the period of time that an adult
would serve for the same offense."4 Whatever the relative mer-
its of the two positions, such statutory changes as were made
41. Id. at 430-32, 228 N.W.2d at 715-16, quoting In re D.M.D. (a minor) v.
State, 54 Wis. 2d 313, 317, 195 N.W.2d 594, 596 (1972).
42. The Wisconsin Council on Criminal Justice, § 5.03, p. 112.
43. Id.
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in 1971 and 197311 have leaned toward the philosophy expressed
in the final report to the governor, that is, reduction of control
of juvenile offenders.
The right of a juvenile to trial by jury was considered by the
United States Supreme Court in 1971. In the companion cases
of McKeiver v. Pennsylvania and In Re Burrus,45 the Court
concluded that a trial by jury is not a constitutional right, but
that any state may install a system providing for a juvenile jury
trial.
McKeiver contains this observation relative to trial before
juvenile court, quoting In the Matter of Edward Terry:46
It has been said such proceedings are to insure that the juve-
nile court will operate in an atmosphere which is orderly
enough to impress the juvenile with the gravity of the situa-
tion and the impartiality of the tribunal and at the same time
informal enough to permit the benefits of the juvenile system
to operate.47
In Wisconsin a jury trial is permitted by section 48.25(2).48
A demand for a jury trial is required and selection of jurors
follows the practice in civil actions. It would seem that a consti-
tutional objection could be addressed to the provision that
practice in civil actions be followed in selection of jurors.
Clearly that part of section 48.25(1) which recites, "The
presence of the child in court may be waived by the court at
any stage of the proceeding," is unconstitutional. It may oper-
ate to deny a juvenile's right to confrontation and cross-
examination. Even before Gault asserted those rights, the con-
stitutionality of that provision was questioned in Winburn v.
State.49
Wisconsin Statutes section 48.25(3) providing that the find-
ing of fact in juvenile trials shall rest on a preponderance of
evidence, was invalidated by the case of In the Matter of Sam-
uel Winship." Winship holds that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is the constitutionally required standard when a juvenile
44. Wis. STAT. §§ 48.34(3)(a), 48.44(2), 48.525, and 48.12(1) (1973).
45. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
46. 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350 (1970).
47. Id. at -, 265 A.2d at 356.
48. Wis. STAT. § 48.25(2) (1973).
49. 32 Wis. 2d 152, 145 N.W.2d 178 (1966).
50. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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is charged with acts which would constitute crimes if commit-
ted by an adult.' 0
Appointment of counsel is authorized on a discretionary
basis by Wisconsin Statutes section 48.25(6). However, since
the decisions of the Supreme Court in Petition of Kent and In
re Gault, the matter is no longer discretionary. Even prior to
these cases, one state, California, required the appointment of
counsel if the child was charged with conduct which would
constitute a felony if committed by an adult.52
Although the Wisconsin legislature has not acted to amend
the invalidated statute, the supreme court has held that a juve-
nile is entitled to representation by counsel as a matter of
constitutional right and, if indigent, he is entitled to have
counsel appointed for him by the juvenile court at an adminis-
trative hearing before a review board considering revocation of
his release to liberty under supervision.53 With specific regard
to the revocation hearing, State ex rel. R.R. v. Schmidt54 enu-
merated other constitutionally required procedures.
The procedural guarantees which are constitutionally re-
quired in revocation hearings consist of the following:
(a) A written statement and notice or reasons revocation
was recommended;
(b) the right to present and cross-examine witnesses;
(c) the right to present arguments and evidence orally
before the hearing examiner;
(d) the right to a transcript if requested;
(e) a prompt notification of the decision; and
(f) the right to inspect and a written reply to the hearing
examiner's report.
Eight years have passed since Gault first outlined the proce-
dural requirements of due process of law with respect to juve-
nile justice. While Wisconsin courts are guided by the law as
prescribed in appellate decisions, the Wisconsin statutes offer
no assistance in several areas because the state legislature has
failed to correct unconstitutional statutory provisions. At each
of the five legislative sessions since Gault was decided, one and
sometimes several bills have been prepared to update the chil-
51. Id.
52. CALIFORNIA WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS CODE, § 634.
53. State ex rel. Bernal v. Hershman, 54 Wis. 2d 626, 196 N.W.2d 721 (1972).
54. 63 Wis. 2d 82, 216 N.W.2d 18 (1974).
55. Id. at 90, 216 N.W.2d at 21.
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dren's code, all of which have died in committee. At the present
time, Assembly Bill 795 is pending legislative action. The Wis-
consin Board of Juvenile Court Judges, a statutory body cre-
ated by Wisconsin Statutes section 257.31, considered the mea-
sure and declined to approve it. Differences in philosophy be-
tween the judges and proponents of the bill can be expected to
cause its death in committee. It would appear that another
legislative session will pass, and the unconstitutional provi-
sions of the children's code will probably remain unchanged.
Some sections may be added or changed not relating to the
constitutional issues by riding along in another bill if prior
legislative sessions are indicative of what may be expected.
Illustrations will follow.
May a juvenile waive his constitutional rights? Is it proper
to admit his confession in evidence against him? Wisconsin has
held that he can waive such rights and that his confession may
be used at his trial." Before that question was considered in
this state, it was held in West v. United States57 that the factors
to be considered in accepting statements of juveniles are: (1)
age of accused; (2) education; (3) knowledge of substance of the
charge and nature of his rights to consult an attorney and to
remain silent; (4) whether held incommunicado or allowed to
consult with relatives, friends or an attorney; (5) whether inter-
rogated before or after formal charges were filed; (6) methods
used in interrogation; (7) length of interrogation; (8) whether
accused refused to give statements on prior occasions; and (9)
whether he repudiated an extra-judicial statement at a later
date. Later, in United States v. Miller,68 the court said, "We
are not prepared to hold that a boy of 14 is never capable of
making an intelligent waiver of his rights. . ... -" In a Minne-
sota case, State v. Lloyd,"0 a confession by a juvenile was ad-
mitted when the court held that a voluntary waiver of constitu-
tional rights by a juvenile offender was proper. Wisconsin's
consideration of that subject is reported in Theriault v. State,"
in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court quoted several authori-
56. Theriault v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 33, 223, N.W.2d 850 (1974).
57. 399 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1968).
58. 453 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1972).
59. Id. at 636.
60. 297 Minn. 442, 212 N.W.2d 671 (1973).
61. 66 Wis. 2d 33, 223 N.W.2d 850 (1975).
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ties, including the Minnesota case referred to above, and
stated:
The courts of numerous states have held that failure to
notify parents or guardian in accord with statute does not per
se render a confession inadmissible unless the statutes ex-
pressly so provide. The failure to promptly notify and the
reasons therefor may be a factor, however, in determining
whether the confession was coerced or voluntary. If the police
fail to call the parents for the purpose of depriving the juve-
nile of the opportunity to receive advice and counsel, that
would be strong evidence that coercive tactics were used to
elicit the incriminating statements. On the other hand where,
as in the instant case, defendant was fully advised of his
rights, and where he failed to avail himself of the opportunity
given him to make a phone call and specifically requested the
police not to call his semi-invalid grandmother because he
was afraid it might adversely affect her health, an inference
of coercion should not be drawn. 2
There is no question but that defendant's confession in
the instant case is admissible in adult criminal proceedings.
He was placed in custody by regular policemen, questioned
at the detective bureau, and warned that his statements
could be used against him "in a court of law." No evidence
indicates defendant confessed expecting that his statements
could only be used in juvenile proceedings.
We conclude, therefore, that none of the defendant's con-
tentions, pointing to the inadmissibility of his admittedly
voluntary confession to the detectives, has any merit and we,
therefore, affirm the judgment of conviction which was based
on a guilty plea made by the defendant after he had con-
fessed. 3
Is a juvenile court required to conduct a probable cause
hearing? In Wisconsin an appeal was taken when such a hear-
ing was denied in the case entitled In Re D.M.D.,64 in which
the court quoted McKeiver in saying, "The applicable due pro-
cess standard in juvenile proceedings is fundamental fair-
ness," 5 and held that a juvenile trial without a prior judicial
determination of probable cause is constitutionally valid.
Dissatisfaction with the rule contained in In Re D.M.D.
62. Id. at 48, 223 N.W.2d at 857.
63. Id. at 52, 223 N.W.2d at 859.
64. 54 Wis. 2d 313, 195 N.W.2d 594 (1971).
65. Id. at 318, 195 N.W.2d at 597.
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relating to probable cause is seen in the 1975 Assembly Bill 795.
A provision would require that probable cause be shown on the
face of the petition filed against any child alleged to have vio-
lated any law. A less exacting standard, designated sufficient
facts to furnish "reasonable notice," is applied to petitions con-
taining allegations not constituting violations of a law.
In Moss v. Weaver,"6 a Florida federal court passed on the
constitutionality of ordering pre-trial detention for juveniles
accused of law violations without according them a probable
cause hearing.
The state maintained that at this stage the court was not
particularly concerned with guilt or innocence, but with the
welfare of the child, and even an innocent child might be de-
tained if detention were necessary for his welfare. The federal
court said:
This concern for the welfare of the juvenile is laudable, but
detention absent a probable cause showing is not constitu-
tional where the juvenile was taken into custody by an arm
of the government for an alleged violation of law.
. . . Since money bail is not available in the Juvenile Court
System, a Judge's decision to detain the juvenile necessarily
results in pretrial detention. The Court is persuaded that a
probable cause hearing must be provided to such detained
juveniles to test the validity of detention, because the event
which triggers their being taken into custody in the first in-
stance is the alleged commission of a criminal offense. In-
deed, the very nature of a delinquency proceeding is to deter-
mine whether the accused has committed a violation of law
... . The commission of an offense is thus the only legal
basis for detention. If the state cannot show that there is
probable cause to believe that the detained juvenile commit-
ted an offense, then the juvenile must be released from cus-
tody. 7
Moss v. Weaver related that the practice had been for an
intake officer to make the first determination concerning re-
taining or releasing a juvenile and went on to say that within
forty-eight hours a judicial detention hearing was conducted at
which the judge considered the matter of further detention. A
statutory provision in Wisconsin68 grants the judge of the juve-
66. 383 F. Supp. 130 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
67. Id. at 133-34.
68. Wis. STAT. § 49.29(2) (1973).
[Vol. 59
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
nile court the right to authorize any person designated by stat-
ute9 to provide services for the court, to order detention of the
child under certain circumstances. In State ex rel. Morrow v.
Lewis"° the court held that after the initial detention of twenty-
four hours permitted by statute, an order for further detention
can be made only by the juvenile court specifying the reason
for such detention and not by a social worker authorized by the
juvenile court judge.
The use of probation officer's reports as evidence at court
hearings was considered by the Wisconsin court in Rusecki v.
State.7 ' That case held that the business entry exception to the
hearsay rule should not be interpreted to allow a probation
officer's report containing hearsay allegations to be received in
evidence, and stated, "Important is preservation of the consti-
tutional rights afforded juveniles, of confrontation and cross-
examination."7 2
The question of the right to bail has not been before the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in a juvenile case, although
Theriault v. State3 made brief reference to the subject in say-
ing:
Thus, the purpose behind notification of parents is to
allow the child to be released to the custody of his parents or
in our case, his legal guardian, until he must appear in court,
unless it is "impracticable, undesirable, or has been other-
wise ordered by the court." Thus this provision is designed
to supplant the need for bail as in adult proceedings.74
No statutory authority provides for release on bail pending trial
or appeal. A New York Appellate Division Court ruled in 1975
that a juvenile has no right to bail, when in People ex rel.
Wayburn on behalf of Charles L. v. Schupf' 5 it said:
69. Wis. STAT. §§ 48.06 and 48.07 (1973).
70. 55 Wis. 2d 502, 200 N.W.2d 193 (1972). The court stated:
We cannot approve of the proceeding under this section whereby the juvenile
judge signs the order of detention made by a social worker without hearing the
evidence or reading the transcript. The signing of such an order by a judge is
not the proper procedure for the operation of a court. There is a difference in
what a judge can do in chambers and as a court. Detention hearings are court
heaiings.
71. 56 Wis. 2d 299, 201 N.W.2d 832 (1973).
72. Id. at 316, 201 N.W.2d at 842.
73. 66 Wis. 2d 33, 223 N.W.2d 850 (1975).
74. Id. at 47, 223 N.W.2d at 857.
75. 47 App. Div. 2d 79, - N.Y.S.2d - (1975).
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The Family Court Act, which governs juvenile proceedings,
nowhere mentions any power to fix or admit to bail. On the
contrary, the statutory scheme gives the court and other au-
thorities only two choices at each step of the proceeding, i.e.,
to either release the juvenile outright to his parent or another
person legally responsible for his care or to detain him in a
juvenile center.
The entire statutory scheme is designed to afford the juve-
nile a speedy preliminary hearing and a speedy fact-finding
hearing, so that he need not be detained, prior to trial, for
more than a brief period of time. Moreover, where the juve-
nile is released to the custody of his parent, such release may
be conditioned upon nothing stronger than a written promise,
without security. To judicially imply a power in the Family
Court to fix bail for a juvenile would impermissibly make the
child's release or detention dependent upon the financial cir-
cumstances of his parent or guardian. 71
Since, as matter of fact, juveniles are often detained for long
periods of time, New York's argument is not impressive. With
the adoption of the "fundamental fairness" doctrine by the
United States Supreme Court and in view of the trend toward
equal rights for juvenile offenders, it would seem probable that
the right to bail in juvenile cases will be prescribed by statute
or case law.
Prior to the enactment of chapter 213 of the Laws of 1971,'7
section 48.34(3)(a) provided for transfer of legal custody to the
department until age twenty-one unless the department dis-
charged the child sooner under section 48.53. Transfer of legal
custody to any person or agency other than the department
could only be for a designated period to be determined by the
court which period was subject to renewal until a child became
twenty-one years of age. Sections of chapter 213 reduced the
period during which legal custody continued to age eighteen.
Persons and agencies other than the department, including
county departments of social services, are required to release a
juvenile in their custody upon his reaching his eighteenth
birthday. Only the Wisconsin Department of Social Services
may petition the court, under section 48.44(2) to retain legal
custody of a person adjudged to be delinquent, who has reached
76. Id. at 81, - N.Y.S.2d at -.
77. Wis. Laws 1971, ch. 213.
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age eighteen. In the absence of such petition, the court is un-
able to exercise further control.
At the hearing stage, when an alleged delinquent is charged
with a serious offense and is months beyond his seventeenth
birthday, a judge is faced with two alternatives. He may stay
within juvenile procedure, which would provide an unsuitable
disposition, or he may waive jurisdiction and order trial in
criminal court. Waiver may appear a ready answer except that
the principle on which the children's code is based is that, "The
best interests of the child shall always be of paramount consid-
eration" and this principle is ignored. It would not be in a
child's best interest to be convicted of a felony and deprived of
citizenship when treatment beyond age eighteen could answer
his needs. Legislation restoring control to juvenile courts of
juveniles over the age of eighteen who have been found delin-
quent would seem to be in the juvenile's best interests.
As stated above, Wisconsin Statutes section 48.44(2) grants
the department the authority to petition the court for the right
to retain legal custody of a person over the age of eighteen who
has been adjudged delinquent. This procedure must comply
with Wisconsin Statutes section 48.52 and 54.32, the latter of
which provides as follows:
Continuance of control; order and application for review
by the committing court. Whenever the department is of the
opinion that discharge of a person from its control at the time
provided in s. 54.31, would be dangerous to the public for
reasons set forth in s. 54.33(2), it shall make an order direct-
ing that the person remain subject to its control beyond that
period and shall make application to the committing court
for a review of that order at least 90 days before the time of
discharge stated. The application shall be accompanied by a
written statement of the facts upon which the department
bases its opinion that discharge of the person from control of
the department at the time stated would be dangerous to the
public.
Thus, the standard established by the statute is whether
termination of control would be dangerous to the public, rather
than whether continued control would be in the best interests
of the child. There will be few petitions for continued control
under the standards set for the department by the statute.
Clearly, there are circumstances when a judge believes that
control beyond age eighteen is in the child's best interests,
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although termination of control over him would not, strictly
speaking, pose a danger to society. The judge is faced with a
vexing problem when he considers the case of a seventeen year
old charged with a serious crime. If he retains jurisdiction in
juvenile court, control ceases soon thereafter if no consideration
is given to proof of the element of danger. On the other hand,
if he transfers jurisdiction to criminal court, the child receives
an adult criminal record which he carries with him for the rest
of his life unless pardoned.
To illustrate probable consequences, consider this set of
facts: An eighteen year old, many-time offender, is released
from the boys' school on the day he reaches his youthful major-
ity. He has no parole officer to monitor his behavior. His free-
dom is complete. His stay was too brief for an adequate pro-
gram of rehabilitation and his new liberty is like heady wine.
He returns to any environment he chooses-very likely the en-
vironment from which he departed before arriving at the boys'
school. His prospect of becoming a useful citizen is remote, and
he will more than likely become a recidivist.
This sad condition, which is detrimental to the juvenile
offender and society, is the result of inattention by the Wiscon-
sin legislature to the need for continuing discipline of weak,
immature young people who, for whatever reason, have been in
deep trouble. However earnest and well intentioned, the propo-
nents of this legislation did not approach obvious problems
realistically. Just as an immature child of tender years requires
direction and discipline to develop a sufficiently strong charac-
ter to become a solid member of society, so does a youth whose
early direction was faulty.
In its report to the 93rd Congress, the Select Committee on
Crime reached a conclusion and made proposals to curb delin-
quency in the United States. The committee proposed:
1. Measures to alleviate some of the contributing factors
to juvenile crime such as poverty, poor housing, educational
failure, and family and home breakdown;
2. Improvements in police functioning in the juvenile area;
3. Alternatives to arrest;
4. Improvements in post-arrest, pre-trial procedures, in-
cluding age-segregated or offense-segregated incarceration;
5. Alternatives to judicial disposition;
6. Use of intake consultants;
7. Improve court procedures;
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8. Correctional innovations such as in-community facili-
ties, adapted group therapy, segregation of offenders by person-
ality type, and home substitutes;
9. Broader consultation with families at every stage;
10. Increased intelligent use (at every stage) of various
existing public and private community-based organizations
and programs, as well as development of new ones; and
11. Improved education of the major participants in the
juvenile process. 8
Proposals from so prestigious a committee are deserving of
respect. Particularly meritorious are recommendations to alle-
viate family and home breakdown and broader consultation
with families at every stage. However, any reference to a need
for discipline is missing from the list.
A tendency to soft pedal discipline, to avoid it, to substitute
for it what is deemed more consideration, understanding, hu-
mane treatment pervades the American approach to child
management. Discipline, whether corporal or otherwise, is an
important factor in the preservation of an orderly society.
Administering discipline wisely is a difficult, unpopular, and
painful process and is too often neglected for those reasons.
Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck, respected Harvard University
social researchers, were quoted on this subject in a newspaper
editorial ten years ago."9 Their prescription for prevention of
delinquency is "great firmness, administered with love."
Among their reasons for a rise in delinquency is slack disci-
pline.
In a treatise on alienation of youth, juvenile delinquency,
adult crime and related problems contained in "Social Prob-
lems and Criminal Justice,"80 authors Emilio Viano and Alvin
Cohn refer to departure from traditional correctional rehabili-
tative practices:
The new model argues in the positivistic tradition that unless
offenders are dealt with in the community and unless of-
fender and community values are intertwined in the treat-
ment process, it will not be possible to produce change and
normative behavior in offenders. Efforts to implement this
philosophy include community-based treatment facilities,
78. SELECT COMMITTEE ON CRIME, REPORT TO 93RD CONGRESS.
79. The Milwaukee Journal, Ap. 27, 1965, quoting U.S. News & World Report.
80. E. VIANO & A. COHN, SOCIAL PROBLEMS & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, (1975).
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such as halfway houses, and new programs, such as work-
release and furloughs from prisons. Whether or not these de-
vices will be any more helpful in controlling and reducing
crime and delinquency remains to be tested."'
These new approaches together with a strong movement to
reduce juvenile rehabilitative institutions has sharply cut the
number of delinquents in custody of this state. Juveniles in all
Wisconsin correctional institutions in 1971 numbered nine
hundred eighty-five."2 In 1974 the total population of all Wis-
consin juvenile institutions was five hundred and fifty-nine. 3
Some of the decline can be attributed to the reduction of the
age of majority and loss of control at age eighteen. Perhaps
more important reasons are early releases and a policy directed
toward reducing the number of such facilities. Kettle Moraine,
a modem, well-operated minimum security boys' school, de-
signed specifically to aid in rehabilitating delinquent boys, has
been closed to juveniles since 1971 when it was converted to an
adult prison. Years of careful planning and effort by the De-
partment of Health and Social Services to create the ideal
rehabilitative surroundings for wayward youth were nullified
with little consideration for the highly publicized original pur-
pose of this excellent facility for juveniles in trouble. Simple
logic leads to the conclusion that a mistake was made-either
in its construction in the late 1960's or else in its removal as
an available facility for rehabilitation of youth in 1971.
If a reduction in juvenile crime can be effected by shorten-
ing periods of custody and control, there could be no criticism
of Wisconsin's new method of procedure. However, what are
the facts? A report by the Select Committee on Crime84 to
Congress on June 29, 1973, recites that from 1960 through 1971
the crime of larceny in America increased 269.6% and robbery
259.5%, and that half of those arrested for burglary and larceny
were under eighteen years of age. Juvenile crime has increased
since the release of those statistics. Senator Claude Pepper,
chairman of the Select Committee made these statements in
the report:
[It is a sign of failure on the part of families and schools as
81. Id.
82. Wis. Blue Book 1975, p. 742.
83. Id.
84. SELECT COMMITTEE ON CRIME, REPORT TO 93RD CONGRESS.
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well as a threat of further deterioration if society does not
meet the correctional challenge those offenders pose ...
While the need to attack the root causes of crime is irrefuta-
ble, we also need to pay increasing attention to the short-term
task of removing from the streets those offenders who are
disrupting the fabric of our society. 5
Earlier this year a Justice Department report revealed a rise
in serious crime in the nation of 17 percent in 1974. Attorney
General Edward Levi called for an emphasis on deterrence to
roll back the crime wave when he said "the figures represent a
dismal and tragic failure on the part of our present system of
criminal justice." He went on to say: "We must understand
that an effective criminal justice system has to emphasize de-
terrence" and stated "There are many causes of crime, but
among them is the failure of our system to move quickly and
effectively to detect and punish offenders. '8
Further evidence of an increase in juvenile delinquency is
,contained in a magazine article entitled "Children and the
Law:"
The statistics on child criminals are awesome. Juvenile crime
has risen by 1,600 per cent in twenty years. More crimes are
committed by children under 15 than by adults over
25-indeed some authorities calculate that half of all crimes
in the nation are committed by juveniles. Last year, police
arrested 2.5 million youngsters under 18. In Los Angeles, ju-
veniles account for more than one-third of all major crimes,
and in Phoenix, officials estimate that juveniles are
responsible for 80 per cent of law violations. In Atlanta, juve-
nile arrests for arson have tripled since 1970, and in New
York, since 1972, burglary and rape charges against juveniles
have nearly doubled."
When an offender is released from custody he returns home,
if there is a home for him. Was a program instituted during the
delinquent's absence to improve home conditions? All of the
statutory provisions are directed at treatment and care for the
juvenile. Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck predicted in 1965 that
"we are in for a period of violence beyond anything we have yet
seen" unless much is done to keep maladjusted parents from
bringing up maladjusted children.
85. Id.
86. The Milwaukee Journal, Mar. 31, 1975.
87. Newsweek, Sept. 8, 1975, p. 71C.
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Our trouble is that everyone is so busy managing the children
who are already delinquent that they don't have the time to
think of how to break the vicious cycle that is building up
delinquency. We are not doing the main thing that must be
done to prevent the pre-delinquent from becoming a full
fledged delinquent by correcting conditions in the home.8
An example of strong home structure is described in a book,
"Japanese Americans."8 9 It presents techniques of social con-
trol relating to traditions which have been long a part of Japa-
nese culture.
In respect to position in the Japanese community, the Japa-
nese family functioned more as a unit. The family was con-
sidered to be more important than its individual members,
who derived their positions inevitably from the position of
their family. Conversely, the family profited from the success
of its members and was damaged by their failures. Family
techniques of social control were firm and effective. Desirable
behavior was strongly reinforced, both within the family and
by the community as a whole. The behavior of any Japanese
was held to be a credit or a blot upon all members of the
Japanese community. The prevailing attitude was "A Japa-
nese delinquent harms us all." Therefore, family standards of
social behavior were reflected in and reinforced by the whole
community.
• . .These family ties were consolidated by family emphasis
on duty, obligation, and responsibility. The Japanese word
giri connotes a moral obligation toward others, and is related
to role position, involving an individual through his family
with the ethnic community as well. He therefore has a re-
sponsibility not only to himself but to his family and to the
community, both of which exert much inhibiting pressure on
deviant behavior.
Whatever the factors responsible for a low crime and delin-
quency rate in Japan, strength of the Japanese family can
hardly be overlooked. Incidence of crime in Tokyo, Japan's
principal city, is related in Britannica, 1975 Book of the Year.9
Tokyo, the world's most populous city with some nine million
people, was probably also the least crime-troubled big city
anywhere in the world. In 1973 Tokyo had 196 murders while
88. The Milwaukee Journal, Ap. 27, 1965, quoting U.S. News & World Report.
89. HARRY H. L. KITANO, JAPANESE AMERICANS, pages 66, 67.
90. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 1975 BOOK OF THE YEAR, p. 198.
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New York City, with a population of only eight million had
1,680. During the same year, New York, with a 31,000-man
police force, had 72,750 reported robberies, Tokyo had 361;
New York had 3,735 reported rapes, Tokyo had 426. While
cities across the U.S. and Europe had experienced spiraling
rates of crime over the past decade, Tokyo's overall crime rate
did not increase and in the category of major crimes, the rate
actually dropped despite steady population growth.
Section 48.34 of the Wisconsin Statutes prescribes the
available methods for disposition of delinquency cases. Except
through a transfer of custody, no provision permits the deten-
tion of a juvenile as a means of discipline. Nor may the court
impose a work program which could be directed at restitution
of stolen or destroyed property, and which could be useful as
an aid to the rehabilitation of the offender. Several proposals,
presented to the legislature in past sessions, contained such
provisions." One such proposal would have empowered the
court to place a delinquent in detention for limited weekends,
or for a period not to exceed twenty consecutive non-school
days. A supervised, limited work program was also suggested.
This kind of proposed legislation died in committee. In light of
the mounting incidence of crime and delinquency, it seems
reasonable to inquire: Would it be inhumane to try discipline?
Edward Eldefonso, in his recent book 2 comments on efforts
to curb juvenile delinquency which he believes to be ineffec-
tive. At one point, he states:
Equally convincing was the contention years ago, and even
today, that if every child were given a fair chance to obtain
an education, his criminal tendencies would be restrained
and crime could be greatly diminished. Thus, playgrounds
have been established in most of the towns and cities of
America, but still crime and delinquency spread at an alarm-
ing rate.
During the early 1930's when the United States was gripped
by an unparalleled depression, people suffered severe economic
deprivation. Agencies were not established to deal with the
problem and dire want went unattended except through pri-
vate charity. It is well known that in the years since, a system
of public welfare has been sponsored by state and federal gov-
91. 1971 Senate Bill 251, 1973 Assembly Bill 510, and 1973 Senate Bill 99.
92. E. ELDEFONSO, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE YOUTHFUL OFFENDER p. 91.
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ernments to relieve economic hardship. Such programs are in-
tended to provide the wherewithal to sustain life and, as a by-
product, to improve the conditions which lead to juvenile delin-
quency. Additional programs intended to curb crime and delin-
quency are extensive, elaborate, and a heavy burden for the
American people. No burden would be too great, if the objec-
tive was accomplished. But it is not.
Poverty, with the unhappiness, deprivation, and frustration
which accompanies it, is considered a major contributing factor
in the high crime and delinquency rate.13 That condition of
economic hardship prevailed during the depression years. Un-
employment plagued this country and frequently families were
without resources to provide the necessities of life. What was
the situation in America relating to crime and delinquency
during that period of crisis? It is revealing to read in Encyclope-
dia Britannica these observations: "During the depression of
the 1930s crime rates in many U.S. cities remained relatively
low, although unemployment and other economic hardships
were widespread.""4 During that period, forty years ago, the na-
tion was unprepared for the condition which came upon it sud-
denly. Because crime and delinquency at that time did not
present the problem which has confronted the United States
for the past twenty years, programs directed at its control were
minimal.
America has a serious problem. On the basis of the coun-
try's experience during the early and mid 1930s, it may be
suggested that the elaborate efforts of the 1970s to curb delin-
quency should be reexamined.
Nearly two generations have come and gone since 1930 and
the country has grown enormously. Population shifts have
changed the composition of its cities. Labor is organized, pros-
perous, and not in awe of capital nor of government. Individual
entrepreneurs apparently are doing well, notwithstanding the
burdens of inflation. The standard of living for the great major-
ity of America's population is the envy of the outside world.
Excellent schools, costly gymnasiums, indoor and outdoor
pools and extensive athletic fields can be found in almost every
community. They are intended to be available to everyone.
America is the greatest country in the world and it is over-
93. SELECT COMMITTEE ON CRIME, REPORT TO 93RD CONGRESS.
94. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 1975 BOOK OF THE YEAR, p. 198.
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whelmed by crime and delinquency.
Two hundred years ago this nation was created on the prin-
ciple of freedom for all its people. Thirteen years later a consti-
tution detailed and guaranteed what were considered funda-
mental human rights. Countless times courts have been re-
quested to rule on those constitutional rights, and great care
has been employed to protect and define them. Were the men
who conceived the constitution to read interpretations of that
document today they may well be disbelieving. Emphasis on
individual rights, rather than those of the civic-minded, law-
abiding majority would seem to be resulting in crime and delin-
quency which are out of control. The comment of University of
Virginia Law School Dean, Monrad G. Paulsen, on the juvenile
justice system, "I'm not going to tell you it's hopeless, because
it may be hopeless"95 need not be an accurate forecast if the
approach to the increasing problem is altered.
95. Newsweek, Sept. 8, 1975, p. 71C.
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